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BOOK REVIEWS

STRATEGY AS A BATTLEGROUND
The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, by Hew Strachan. Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013. 322 pages. $66.70 (paperback $26.99; Kindle $17.20).

About halfway through his account of
the direction of war, the distinguished
Oxford military historian Hew Strachan
makes a seemingly minor point about
Bernard Brodie, one of the pioneers of
limited-war theory during the Cold War.
“Brodie had studied Socratic philosophy
and had been trained as a historian.
These were in some sense the traditional
disciplines of strategic thought,” but in
the early nuclear age they “were now
in retreat” (p. 187). Some might doubt
that a Socratic approach combined with
historical inquiry is a foundation of
strategic thought, or at least of Brodie’s,
but in truth Strachan thereby described
his own approach to strategic theory
and practice as well as anyone possibly could. Strachan, however, is not in
retreat. He has taken the initiative and
is very much on the offensive—against
just about everyone’s sacred cow.
Following Clausewitz directly and perhaps Socrates’s greatest student, Plato,
indirectly, Strachan has a dialectical approach to thinking about strategy, which
is fundamentally a conversation, the sort
any war college could only welcome.
It occurs at many levels, and often the
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interlocutors speak at cross-purposes.
Most fundamentally it is a conversation
between theory and practice, one insisting on clarity and therefore abstraction,
the other on concrete experience.
As the conversation develops, Strachan
brings in new interlocutors. Virtually all
the great and many minor strategic theorists and practitioners of the modern era
have something to say in this dialogue:
Clausewitz, of course, but also Jomini,
Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Billy Mitchell,
Brodi, Herman Kahn, Mao Zedong;
Generals Powell, Clark, Petraeus, and
McChrystal; Admirals Morgan and Mullen; and many, many others. While they
converse with each other, all also are
engaged in a conversation with practice,
i.e., what works and what does not.
That conversation is rooted in a
deeper one about the relation of the
past (continuity and change) to the
present and the foreseeable future
(contingency), meaning Strachan harnesses his vast understanding of the
past to help us think about the future
direction of strategy and war. His
dialogue is always about at least these
three big questions: What is strategy?
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Who should direct it? And where and
how should it be made (p. 215)?
Those looking for a clear answer to the
first question are likely to be disappointed. Strachan observes that Clausewitz’s
“On War contains many references to
the need for principles and system, but
never delivers them in a way designed to
be learnt by the parrots of military crammers and spoon-fed examinees” (p. 203).
Neither does Strachan. Like Socrates, he
is an interrogator. He asks what other
people, such as the British prime minister and the American president and
their military and other subordinates,
mean by policy, grand strategy, military
strategy, and operations. Like Socrates
again, he is pretty sure either they do
not know or their views are one-sided,
if not misguided, and at best limited
in utility to a particular moment in
time. He frustrates his readers as much
as Socrates does in Plato’s dialogues
because he never quite defines strategy
himself. It exists somewhere between
war’s political purpose and operations
that purport to achieve it (p. 220).
As a middle ground between political
purpose and military action, strategy
also becomes a battleground between
those who make policy and those who
design and execute operations to achieve
it. Strachan’s focus is often on the disappearance of strategy in this conflict.
Sometimes it is subsumed by policy,
which is what he insists happened during the Cold War, when the purpose of
strategy was to ensure that major-power,
i.e., nuclear, war did not occur, so the
use of violence to achieve political
objectives among major powers against
each other became unthinkable. This
also happened after the Cold War, when
strategy as a means to achieve political
purposes was nearly extinct (with many,
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in Europe especially, welcoming its
demise), and operations came to occupy
the middle ground. This was especially
true in the United States, though in such
a narrow way that Strachan ascribes
fleeting successes in Afghanistan and
Iraq after 9/11 and 2003 to the triumph,
i.e., failure, of merely operational thinking. So, in many ways his book becomes
a discussion of civil-military relations,
with a powerful critique of the pioneer
of the field, Samuel Huntington.
Like Socrates, Strachan is willing to
question taboos. He argues that, in
both England and the United States, the
danger of a military leader on a white
horse coming to power at the expense of
freedom was vastly exaggerated. Liberal
principles had taken such deep root in
the people that a military coup d’état
was simply inconceivable. What private
in the U.S. or British military would
obey an order from a general to arrest
the president or prime minister? So
Huntington’s principle of strict separation between the roles of statesmen and
generals was not merely unnecessary
but in many ways counterproductive.
“The principal purpose of effective civilmilitary relations is national security: its
output is strategy. Democracies tend to
forget that” (p. 76). Following Clausewitz, whom he uses to criticize rather
than support Huntington, Strachan insists that war is interactive, the realm of
chance, friction, contingency, and unexpected actions from the adversary. And
war has its own grammar, often leading
to escalation. War, in other words, has its
own nature, which politics defies at its
own risk. A good Clausewitzian might,
indeed must, try to impose the political
logic of war on all this, but once the dogs
of war are unleashed, they tend to make
havoc—that is, they follow their own
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direction. As often as not, then, policy
and strategy are directed by war; they do
not direct it. Responding to that reality
requires a dialogue between soldiers and
politicians—not the subordination of
one element to the other, but rather their
“harmonization” (p. 78). For any kind
of rationality to be imposed, politics
must therefore listen to strategy, which
must listen to war, both in its enduring
nature and in its changing character.
All this suggests a far more prominent
role in the conversation for generals
and admirals than current norms, often
violated in practice, tend to permit.
As a student of the American founders
and the American political tradition,
this reviewer is not sure Strachan is right
to challenge the Anglo-American taboos
as much as he does. As a professor of
strategy, however, I am certain Strachan
has captured something vital for understanding the direction of any war.
It arises from Clausewitz’s discussion
of war as more than a true chameleon
changing its colors from war to war. War
does have a nature. It is embodied especially in Clausewitz’s trinity: the relation
among reason, passion, and creativity
that exists in any war. But that relation
changes from war to war. Sometimes one
element is more important than another,
which gives an entirely different direction to a conflict than the one preceding
or succeeding it. Sometimes the elements quarrel among themselves. Each
attempts to give direction to war, and
the changing historical direction of war
is very much the result of the conversation among the parts and the interaction
of their whole with others. No wonder,
then, that Strachan does not give us the
clear and final answers we crave. War
will not allow them; neither will he. We
therefore will have to figure the answers
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out for ourselves. A fine way to start is
by reading this subtle and erudite book.
KARL WALLING

Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China,
Russia, and the United States’ Pursuit of Relevancy
and Power, by Gregory O. Hall. New York: Routledge, 2015. 188 pages. $145 (paperback $42.95).

Gregory O. Hall, a professor of political science at Morehouse College, has
taken an acknowledged fact of contemporary international relations—the
dominance of the United States, Russia,
and China within the international
system—and developed a compelling
academic model supporting this.
Hall argues that the Tripolar Conflict,
Cooperation, and Competition (TC3)
Framework model reflects the reality of the international system since
at least the early 2000s. From Central
Asia to the Middle East and Northeast
Asia, Hall demonstrates that the United
States, China, and Russia are locked in
a complex web of interrelationships that
increasingly determines the outcome
of pressing regional, and even global,
issues. As the traditional economic and
military advantages of the United States
decline relative to those of some rising
powers, the international system will be
even more defined by the interactions
of these three dominant global powers.
Hall cogently traces the gradual transition of the global system following the
“unipolar” moment that emerged after
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the
early 1990s. While the United States
remains first among equals in numerous
metrics of national power, the comparative diminution of its own influence
and the rise of other power centers
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